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a b s t r a c t
Continuous consensus (CC) is the problem of maintaining up-to-date and identical copies
of a ‘‘core’’ of information about the past at all correct processes in the system (Mizrahi
and Moses, 2008 [6]). This is a primitive that supports simultaneous coordination among
processes, and eliminates the need for issuing separate instances of consensus for
different tasks. Recent work has presented new simple and efficient optimum protocols for
continuous consensus in the crash and (sending) omissions failure models. For every
pattern of failures, these protocols maintain at each and every time point a core that
subsumes that maintained by any other continuous consensus protocol. This paper
considers the continuous consensus problem in the face of harsher failures: general
omissions and authenticated Byzantine failures. Computationally efficient optimum
protocols for CC do not exist in these models if P 6= NP . A variety of CC protocols are
presented. The first is a simple protocol that enters every interesting event into the core
within t + 1 rounds (where t is the bound on the number of failures), provided there are
a majority of correct processes. The second is a protocol that achieves similar performance
so long as n > t (i.e., there is always guaranteed to be at least one correct process). The final
protocol makes use of active failure monitoring and failure detection to include events in
the core much faster in many runs of interest. Its performance is established based on a
nontrivial property of minimal vertex covers in undirected graphs. The results are adapted
to the authenticated Byzantine failure model, in which it is assumed that faulty processes
are malicious, but correct processes have unforgeable signatures. Finally, the problem of
uniform CC is considered. It is shown that a straightforward version of uniform CC is not
solvable in the setting under study. A weaker form of uniform CC is defined, and protocols
achieving it are presented.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Fault-tolerant systems often require ameans bywhich independent processes or processors can arrive at an exactmutual
agreement of some kind. As a result, reaching consensus is a fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing;
work on consensus dates back to the seminal work of Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [8]. When the different processes need
to reach compatible decisions at the same time, they often need to reach simultaneous consensus about particular aspects of
the execution. While the first protocols designed for the synchronous message passing model achieved consensus at the
same round (e.g. [8]), it was noticed by Dolev et al. [4] that non-simultaneous solutions can sometimes decidemore quickly.
Later work showed that simultaneous consensus requires common knowledge, and that this is a nontrivial requirement [3].
Nevertheless, the need for simultaneous decisions to be compatible is often natural: for example, when different processes
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need to access distinct physical resources ‘at the same time’, orwhen one distributed algorithmends and another one begins,
and the two use similar messages for different purposes.
We consider a synchronous message-passing system in which processes receive external inputs from the outside world
at various times. Suppose that we are interested in maintaining a simultaneously consistent view regarding a set of
‘‘interesting’’ events E in the system. The particular events that are of interest are application-dependent, but they will
typically be events such as inputs that processes receive at various times, values that certain variables obtain at given times,
and faulty behavior in the form of failed or inconsistent message deliveries. A continuous consensus (CC) protocol (cf. [6])
monitors these events, bymaintaining at all times k ≥ 0 a coreMi[k] of events of E at every site i. In every run of this protocol
the following properties are required to hold, for all nonfaulty processes i and j.
Accuracy: All events inMi[k] occurred in the run.
Consistency: Mi[k] = Mj[k] at all times k.
Completeness: If the occurrence of an event e ∈ E is known to process j at any point, then e ∈ Mi[k] for some k.
Decisions performed by different correct processes in the same round can be chosen consistently if they are based on the
core of a CC protocol. Indeed, once an event recording a particular value or vote enters the core, the processes automatically
have simultaneous consensus regarding it. Finally, a CC protocol can replace the need for initiating separate instances of a
consensus protocol. By monitoring different events in E , the protocol can automatically ensure consensus on a variety of
issues.
The continuous consensus problemwas introduced in [6], where itwas studied in the crash and sending omissions failure
models. This generalized and simplified earlier relatedwork in [3,7]. Themain results of [6] are simple and efficient optimum
CCprotocols for both crash and sending omissions failures in the synchronousmessage-passingmodel, given anupper bound
of t < n− 1 on the total number of failures. The core provided by their protocol at time k for any particular behavior of the
adversary is the union of all the cores provided by all correct CC protocols under the same adversarial conditions.
In this paperwe extend the study of the continuous consensus problem tomore general failuremodels: general omissions
and authenticated Byzantine failures. In the former, a faulty process may fail to send a subset of the messages prescribed by
its protocol, as well as failing to receive a subset of the messages sent to it in a given round. In the authenticated Byzantine
failuremodel, faulty processes aremalicious, but correct processes have unforgeable signatures. This ability to signmessages
implies that correct processes cannot bemisquoted aboutmessages that contain their signatures. As a result, the two failure
models are actually quite similar. One property that they share is the fact that when a process i reports not having received
a message that another process j was supposed to have sent, this is proof that (at least) one of them is faulty. But the proof
leaves open the identity of the culprit. This is in contrast to the situation in the crash and sending omissions models, where
an unreceived message proves that the intended sender is faulty. This distinction turns out to have significant implications
on the efficiency of solutions to the continuous consensus problem. While the optimum protocols in [6] for the simpler
failure models can be implemented using linear-time computations and O(n)-bit messages, we adapt a result of [7] to show
the following1:
Lemma 1. If P 6= NP then there exists no polynomial-time protocol implementing an optimum solution to continuous consensus
in the general omission (resp. in the authenticated Byzantine) failure model.
The lack of an efficient optimum solution is not unusual. For eventual consensus, for example, it was shown in [7] that no
optimum protocol exists at all, even in the crash failure model. Our goal here is to find relatively efficient protocols for
continuous consensus, in challenging failure models. Our main contributions are the following:
– We present a simple CC protocol that enters every event from the set of monitored events into the core within t + 1
rounds (where t is the bound on the number of failures), provided there are a majority of correct processes (i.e., n > 2t).
– We improve this protocol to one that achieves similar performance so long as n > t (i.e., there is always guaranteed to
be at least one correct process).
– Finally, we use faultmonitoring and failure detection to obtain a protocol that inmany runswill include events in the core
within much fewer than t + 1 rounds of their discovery by a correct process. This protocol, called VC-CC, is based on the
construction of a conflict graph [7,1,5] and an analysis of failures in such graphs. Intuitively, a conflict graph is one whose
nodes are process names, and where an edge appears if there is an inconsistency between the processes represented by
the two nodes. This implies that at least one of themmust be faulty. The nodes of faulty processes must at all times form
a vertex cover of the (edges of the) conflict graph. By convention, the size of the minimal vertex cover of a graph G is
called its vc number, and is denoted by vc#(G). The correctness of the VC-CC protocol makes use of the following graph -
theoretic property: If G = (V , E) and vc#(G) = b, then there exists a setH ⊆ V of size |H| ≤ 2b such that vc#(G[H]) = b,
where G[H] is the subgraph of G induced by H . We prove this fact based on a fine-grained characterization of minimal
vertex covers due to Chlebík and Chlebíková [2].
– We present two types of protocols. One type consists of computationally efficient protocols that have good behavior in
the best case, and more theoretical protocols that make use of an NP oracle and produce good performance much more
often.
1 The proofs of Lemmas 1–3 are given in Appendix A.
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– In the simpler crash and sending omission failuremodels [6], the basic optimumprotocol is enhanced to yield an optimum
solution for uniform CC. The resulting protocol guarantees that all processes – both faulty and nonfaulty – have the same
core at all times. Moreover, the core contains exactly what it would under the optimal (non-uniform) protocol. In the
general omission and the authenticated Byzantine models, it is shown that there are no solutions to CC in which all
processes have the same core. Essentially, if a faulty processmight be blocked from receiving anymessages for arbitrarily
long periods, then there is no way to ensure that it will maintain a growing core with useful and up-to-date information.
We define a condition of weak uniform consistency, in which the core of a faulty processes is required to be a subset of
the cores of nonfaulty processes, and show that this version is attainable.
2. Continuous consensus in the generalized omission model
2.1. Using Authentication
Our analysis of the CC problem in the generalized omission model uses an authentication scheme. Pease, Shostak
and Lamport [8] presented an algorithm that reaches agreement in a fault-prone system using authentication. Since the
generalized omissions model can in fact be viewed as a simplified particular case of the authenticated Byzantine model,
this analysis is valid in the generalized omissions model as well. Thus, our algorithms in this section are presented for the
authenticated Byzantine model.
We assume that all messages sent in the system are authenticated by unforgeable signatures that enable processes to
verify the source of the information they send and receive. Since there are no ‘‘liars’’ in the generalized model, a process
may sign a message by simply adding its name to the message. In the authenticated Byzantine model, it is assumed that the
signatures are unforgeable. So, despite the fact that some of the processes may be ‘‘liars’’, the signatures can also be used to
verify the reliability of the information.2
Adding signatures to the data sent in the system enables each process to keep track of the knowledge of other processes.
When a process receives a signed message it obtains information regarding other processes that have received and signed
this message, by observing the signatures included.
2.2. Notation
We now present some terminology and definitions regarding the usage of authentication in our system. As in [6],
our logical language consists of propositions referring to a set E of monitored events. For simplicity, we identify the
set of monitored events E with a set of propositions ΦE = {pe : e ∈ E}, and restrict monitored events to depend
only on the external inputs and undelivered messages in the current run. Moreover, we assume that E contains all the
events corresponding to process i not receiving a message from j in round k. We denote the corresponding proposition by
nrec(i, j, k).
We assume that each message is a sequence of atomic messages called datagrams. A datagram is either a proposition,
pe ∈ ΦE , or a signed proposition. A signed proposition consists of a proposition and a list of process signatures. Denote byΨ
the set of all possible datagrams in the system. Clearly, ΦE ⊂ Ψ . We also define the operation signi : Ψ → Ψ for a process
i, so that if α ∈ Ψ then signi(α) is a datagram containing the information in α signed by process i. Formally, Ψ is defined as
the least set containing ΦE that is closed under the operations signi(·) for all i ∈ P. In a given run, we denote by RCVDi(k)
the set of datagrams received by i in round k.
Let α = signpd(. . . signp2(signp1(ϕ))) be a datagram with d ≥ 1 signatures. If p1, . . . , pd are pairwise distinct processes,
then α is called a d-signed datagram, and ϕ is d-authenticated by α. We further define a function F : Ψ → ΦE , where,
intuitively,F (α) is the proposition pe ∈ ΦE embedded in the datagram α. Formally, for every datagram α, we haveF (α) =
ϕ if there exists a sequence 〈p1, . . . , ps〉 of processes, not necessarily distinct, such that α = signps(. . . signp2(signp1(ϕ)))
and ϕ ∈ ΦE .
2.3. A CC protocol with authentication
In this subsection we present two protocols that solve the continuous consensus problem in the generalized omissions
model using Authentication.
In Fig. 1 we present the first protocol, Acc (which stands for Authenticated Continuous Consensus). Each process i runs the
protocol individually, and computes a core Mi[k] in every round k. The core is guaranteed to be shared among the nonfaulty
processes. Process i places a proposition ϕ in its core when it receives a (t + 1)-signed datagram α such that F (α) = ϕ.
Every process sends and receivesmessages according to a protocol we call sfip, which is a full-information protocol inwhich
signatures are used to authenticate every piece of information delivered in the system. In sfip every process broadcasts its
information, adding its signature to it. More formally, a sfip is a protocol with the following properties:
2 In practice, by having a public-key infrastructure in our system, one may produce cryptographic signatures which are unforgeable with very high
probability.
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Acci(t)
Mi[k] ← ∅ for all k ≥ −1 % initialization
for k ≥ 0, in round k
do
1 send and receive messages according to a sfip
2 for each α ∈ RCVDi(k)
3 if α is a (t + 1)-signed datagram then
4 Mi[k] ← Mi[k] ∪ F (α)
5 end for
6 Mi[k] ← Mi[k− 1] ∪Mi[k]
end for
Fig. 1. The Acc protocol for process i.
AccDi(t)
Mi[k] ← ∅ for all k ≥ −1 % initialization
for k ≥ 0, in round k
do
1 send and receive messages according to a sfip
2 for α ∈ RCVDi(k)
3 if α is a d-signed datagram for some 1 ≤ d ≤ t + 1 then
4 Mi[k+ (t + 1)− d] ← Mi[k+ (t + 1)− d] ∪ F (α)
5 end for
6 Mi[k] ← Mi[k− 1] ∪Mi[k]
end for
Fig. 2. The AccD protocol for process i.
– A sfip is, in particular, a fip, that is, in every round, every process sends a message encoding all of its information to all
other processes. In particular, if i does not receive a message from j in round m then i will sign and send nrec(i, j,m) in
roundm+ 1.
– Every primitive proposition p ∈ ΦE sent by process i is signed by i.
– In every round k, each process i relays all datagrams received in the previous round, adding its own signature to every
datagram.
Intuitively, once a process receives a sequence of t+1 signatures forϕ, it is guaranteed that at least one nonfaulty process
has received information aboutϕ, and has forwarded it to all nonfaulty processes. These, in turn, are able to sign and forward
the datagram. Thus, as stated in Lemma 2, all nonfaulty processes will add ϕ to their cores simultaneously.
Lemma 2. Acc (t) solves Continuous Consensus for n > 2t in the authenticated Byzantine failure model.
In Fig. 2we presentAccD, which is a slight variant ofAcc. InAccD, for every datagramϕ that process i receives, i computes
the round in which ϕ is expected to become a (t + 1)-authenticated proposition. This resembles the concept of horizon
presented in [6]: in each round of the ConCon protocol presented there every process i tries to compute a ‘‘horizon’’ by
which current-time information is guaranteed to enter the core. AccD can also be viewed as defining a ‘‘horizon’’ that is
defined and computed differently. In AccD, the horizon is computed for each proposition individually, rather than for a
whole round at once.
Lemma 3. AccD (t) solves Continuous Consensus for n > t in the authenticated Byzantine failure model.
2.4. Discussion of Acc and AccD
Lower Bound on n. Notice that while Acc requires n > 2t , AccD requires just n > t . The reason that we require n > 2t for
Acc is that a proposition is included in the core once it is signed by t + 1 signatures. Thus, as the proof of Lemma 2 shows,
once a proposition reaches a nonfaulty process, it is forwarded sequentially to other nonfaulty processes, and within at
most t+1 rounds it is bound to become a (t+1)-authenticated proposition. Specifically, an event that occurs at a nonfaulty
process imust be forwarded through a sequence of t different nonfaulty processes in order for it to be included in the core.
To guarantee that this is possible, we must assume that n > 2t so that there are at least t + 1 nonfaulty processes. AccD,
on the other hand, does not require n > 2t , since if a d-signed datagram α reaches a nonfaulty process i at time m, then i
forwards the datagram to all nonfaulty processes in roundm+1, enabling them to includeF (α) in the core atm+(t+1)−d.
More efficient implementations of sfips. Wepreviously defined a full-information protocolwith signatures, sfip, as a protocol
similar to fip except that it authenticates all messages using signatures.While it has been shown [6] that a fip in our context
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may be implemented quite efficiently, the overhead added by the authentication mechanism in a sfip may be fairly high.
Since every datagram in a sfip is relayed by every process i, adding its own signature, it is easy to see that if a primitive
proposition p ∈ ΦE is sent by some process i at time 0, then the number of datagrams about p in round k is O(nk). If every
signature has length sl, and every datagram has O(k) signatures, then a message about p requires a length of O(sl · k · nk).
Since we have n such messages in round k, we require O(sl · k · n · nk) signatures in every round. It is possible, however, to
derive a more efficient implementation of sfips, by applying the following techniques:
(i) Avoid multiple instances: In order to avoid multiple datagrams for every proposition, we can have each process i,
relay at most one datagram corresponding to a primitive proposition p in each round. In particular, for each primitive
proposition p, process i relays one datagram corresponding to p with the maximal number of signatures. In addition,
i does not forward datagrams that include i’s signature from previous rounds, since they have already been sent by
i. Avoiding multiple instances of the same proposition helps reduce the communication complexity of signatures on
datagrams about p to O(n2) in every round.
(ii) Early stopping: Since in Acc we are not interested in datagrams with more than t + 1 signatures, once process i
receives a (t+1)-signed datagramα, it stops sending any datagrams containingF (α). This reduces the communication
complexity of sending p toO(n · t) in every round. As for AccD, once process i receives amessage containing a datagram
α, it relays the datagram just once. In all future rounds, process i ignores all datagrams β with F (α) = F (β), which
reduces the communication complexity of signatures on datagrams about p to O(n).
(iii) Nominating relay processes: InAcc, it is possible to nominate 2t+1 processes to sign the data they send, while the rest
of the processes follow the standard fip. This allows for a communication complexity of O(t2), while still enabling the
protocol towork correctly. Similarly, inAccDwe can nominate t+1 processes, reducing the communication complexity
further to O(t).
Uniformity. The uniform continuous consensus (UCC) problem was presented in [6]. UCC requires all processes, including
the faulty ones, to have the same core at all times. In the crash and omission models, the protocol Acc presented in Fig. 2
solves UCC. Since in these models a faulty process is assumed to receive all messages sent to it, it is easy to verify that every
faulty process receives a (t+1)-signed datagram α at exactly the same time that the nonfaulty processes receive it, and can
thus include α in its core. On the other hand, AccD is not uniform, since its correctness depends on the process i running the
protocol being nonfaulty; only a nonfaulty process may assume that a d-signed datagram is guaranteed to be relayed to all
the nonfaulty processes, and become common knowledge in t + 1− d rounds.
In the generalized omissions model, we do not even have uniformity for Acc, since a faulty process may fail to receive
many or even all of the messages sent to it, keeping its core from growing as it should. A uniform solution would have
to ensure that every faulty process maintains the same core as nonfaulty processes. It can be shown that no protocol
can guarantee both Completeness (which is defined for nonfaulty processes) and Uniform Consistency in the generalized
omission model (see [6]). It is possible, however, to obtain a weaker variant of the Uniform Consistency property.
Weak Uniform Consistency: Let j, z ∈ P. If j is nonfaulty, thenMz[k] ⊆ Mj[k] at all times k.
We say that a protocol solves the weak UCC problem (WUCC for short), if it satisfies Accuracy, Consistency and
Completeness (recall that these focus only on nonfaulty processes and their cores), and in addition it also satisfies Accuracy
for the cores of faulty processes and Weak Uniform Consistency, which relates the cores of faulty and nonfaulty processes.
It is easy to see that Acc solves the WUCC problem in the generalized omissions model.
3. CC in the generalized omission model – improved protocols
In the previous section we presented AccD and Acc. Both of these protocols solve the CC problem in the generalized
model. However, in both of these protocols no event may be included in the core earlier than t + 1 rounds after it occurs. In
this section we discuss different solutions to the CC problem, which provide a richer core, and enable some propositions to
join the core earlier than they would in either of the two protocols above.
Much like the protocols in the previous section, our protocol uses message authentication. The idea is that if, in round
k, it is confirmed that a subset S(k) ⊆ P contains at least s faulty processes, then we know that S(k), the complement
of S(k), contains at most t − s faulty processes, allowing us to add propositions that are (t − s + 1)-authenticated to the
core. Interestingly, without identifying specific faulty processes, we make use of the fact that the existence of s failures is
guaranteed in order to obtain faster agreement.
3.1. The conflict graph
Moses and Tuttle [7] prove that the problem of testing for common knowledge in the generalized omission model is
NP-hard by showing a Turing reduction from the Vertex Cover problem to the problem of testing for common knowledge. It
follows from their analysis that information about the number and identities of faulty processes can be obtained by a Vertex
Cover computation, as we now describe.
We will focus on conflicts that are derived from the core maintained by a process. We define the conflict graph based on
a given core Mi to be the graph Gi(k) = (P, Ei(k)) defined as follows. It contains a node for each process, and there is an
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AccIi(t)
Mi[k] ← ∅, BM [k] ← ∅ for all k ≥ −1 % initialization
for k ≥ 0, in round k
do
1 repeat until BM [k] stabilizes
2 send and receive messages according to a sfip
3 for α ∈ RCVDi(k)
4 if α is (t − |BM [k]| + 1)-signed by P\BM [k] then
5 Mi[k] ← Mi[k] ∪ F (α)
6 end for
7 Mi[k] ← Mi[k− 1] ∪Mi[k]
8 for all j ∈ P
9 BM [k] ← j ifMi[k] implies that j is faulty
10 end repeat
end for
Fig. 3. The AccI protocol for process i in the generalized omission model.
edge { j, h} ∈ Ei(k) if a proposition nrec( j, h,m) or nrec(h, j,m), for some m, appears in Mi. Thus, an edge represents the
fact that the core contains evidence that at least one message between j and h (in either direction) has not been delivered
successfully. Gi(k) is called a Conflict Graph, since each of its edges stands for a conflict between its adjacent nodes: at most
one of them is nonfaulty. It is easy to see that the nodes representing the processes that have displayed faulty behavior up
to round k form a vertex cover of Gi(k). Therefore, if Gi(k) has aminimum vertex cover of size s, then there must be at least s
faulty processes in r . Our protocol VC-CC is based on these properties of the conflict graph. These properties may be used to
include some facts in the core earlier than they would be included by either Acc or AccD.
3.2. A simple protocol using the conflict graph
We first present a very simple protocol, which is an extension ofAcc. The protocol is called AccI (short for Improved Acc),
and is given in Fig. 3. The idea is that instead of defining the core to contain all (t+1)-signed facts, we allow the information
about failures that appears in the core to reduce this t + 1 round margin. For example, if the fact that process z is faulty is
derivable from the core, then the fact that there are at most t − 1 faulty processes among P\{z} also follows from the core.
Thus, receiving t signatures from processes in the set P\{z} should be enough to include a fact in the core.
In every round of AccI, each process constructs a conflict graph according to the information in the core. We denote
by BM [k] the set of processes that are confirmed to be faulty according to information in Mi[k]. Formally, the set BM [k] is
defined inductively. If the conflict graph contains edges from a process z to at least t+1 different processes, then z ∈ BM [k].
More generally, z ∈ BM [k] if z has at least t − BM [k] + 1 conflicts with processes in P\BM [k]. Updating BM [k] may require
iterating the steps above until BM [k] stabilizes. Note that AccI has polynomial running time, since it requires only counting
the number of edges connected to each node, which is computationally efficient.
3.3. VC-CC
The VC-CC protocol (short for vertex-cover based CC) is presented in Fig. 4. In each round k, every process i computes a
conflict graph Gi(k) based on its core. Since the core is identical at all nonfaulty sites, the fact that processes use only conflict
datagrams in the core to determine the edges of Gi(k) guarantees that they all use the same conflict graph. The subroutine
Auth(G, α, t) used on line 5 of VC-CC is defined in Fig. 5. Its purpose is to determine whether there is new information that
can be added to the core, based on the recently received messages and the current conflict graph G. The computation of
Auth(G, α, t)makes use of computations of minimal vertex covers of the conflict graph and some of its subgraphs. Thus, if
P 6= NP then it is not polynomial, and is unlikely to be practical.
After updating the coreMi at time k (on line 5), the conflict graph based on the core may change. The new conflict graph
is computed on line 7. If the conflict graph has indeed changed, then we iterate through the loop on lines 4–8 again. We
continue to do this until there are no further changes to Mi. The value of Mi then becomes the core Mi[k] for time k (see
line 9).
The subroutine Auth(G, α, t) performs a test on α according to the conflict graph G(`)i . On line 2, the graph G[P\D] is
the subgraph of G induced by the set of nodes P\D. Observe that we do not provide efficient implementations for the
computations in lines 3 and 5 of Auth. The main part of the proof of Theorem 1 will show that when Auth(G(`)i , α, t) is
called by VC-CC and returns TRUE, then F (α) can safely be included in the core. Initially, Auth computes all vertex covers
of Gwith at most t nodes. Denote these vertex covers of G by ν1, . . . , νs. Define
X ,
m⋂
j=1
νj.
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VC-CCi(t)
0 Mi ← ∅; Mi[0] ← Mi % initialization
for k ≥ 1 in round k do
1 send and receive messages according to sfip
2 `← 1
3 compute G(1)i based onMi
repeat
4 for each α ∈ RCVDi(k) do
5 if Auth(G(`)i , α, t) then Mi ← Mi ∪ F (α)
end for
6 `← `+ 1
7 compute G(`)i based onMi
8 until G(`)i = G(`−1)i
9 Mi[k] ← Mi
end for
Fig. 4. The VC-CC protocol for process i in the generalized omission model.
Auth(G, α, t)
1 if α is d-signed by a set of processes D such that d ≤ t then
2 G ′ ← G[P\D]
3 b← vc#(G ′)
4 if d ≥ t − b+ 1 then return TRUE
5 Compute X = ⋂ {Vertex covers of G of size ≤ t}
6 if α contains at least t − |X | + 1 signatures from P\X or
7 α is a (t + 1)-signed datagram then return TRUE else return FALSE
Fig. 5. The Auth procedure used in VC-CC.
The set X is the intersection of all vertex covers of size t , and thus includes all nodes that correspond to processes that are
forced to be faulty, given the information in G.
Wenowprove thatVC-CC solves the continuous consensus problem. As a first step,we state the graph-theoretic property,
proved in Appendix B, that is used in the proof.
Lemma 4. If G = (V , E) is an undirected graph and vc#(G) = b, then there exists a set H ⊆ V of size |H| ≤ 2b such that
vc#(G[H]) = b, where G[H] is the subgraph of G induced by H.
We can now state and prove our main theorem, establishing the correctness of the VC-CC algorithm:
Theorem 1. VC-CC solves Continuous Consensus for n > 3t in the general omissions failure model.
Proof. We prove each of the Accuracy, Completeness and Consistency properties separately. Most of the proof is devoted
to establishing Consistency.
Accuracy. If an event e is included in the coreMi[k] for a nonfaulty process i, then at some earlier timem ≤ k, e is inserted
into the core at line 5 of VC-CC. Thus, by line 4 of the protocol, a message about the event was received by i in round m.
Moreover, since processes all follow the protocol and pe is authenticated on line 5, it follows that pe ∈ ΦE and that e is
guaranteed to have occurred (at the original sender’s site). The Accuracy property follows.
Completeness. Assume that an event e ∈ E occurs at a nonfaulty process j at timem, and is thus included in j’s local state and
is known to j at time m. Since j is nonfaulty, it successfully sends a message notifying the other nonfaulty processes about
e’s occurrence. If e is not entered into the core before timem+ t + 1 then, since n > 3t , at the end of roundm+ t + 1 every
nonfaulty process will receive a (t + 1)-signed datagram about e. Following line 7 of the Auth subroutine, every nonfaulty
process will then include pe in its core, ensuring Completeness.
Consistency. Finally, for Consistency we show that if i and j are nonfaulty then Mi[k] = Mj[k] for all k ≥ 0. The proof is by
induction on k. For k = 0 we haveMi[0] = Mj[0] = ∅ by line 0 of VC-CC. For the inductive step, letm > 0, and assume that
Mi[m−1] = Mj[m−1]. We prove thatMi[m] = Mj[m]. Observe that, at timem, every process executingVC-CC performs one
ormore iterations of the loop on lines 4–8. Since the set of signed datagrams α ∈ RCVDi(m) received by i in roundm is finite,
it performs a finite number of such iterations. We shall refer to this number by `i. The computation at timem (at the end of
roundm) starts out with the coreMi having the contents ofMi[m− 1] obtained at timem− 1. We denote byM(1)i the value
ofMi[m− 1] (defined on line 0 ifm− 1 = 0 and on line 9 otherwise). For 2 ≤ c ≤ `i, we denote byM(c)i the value ofMi in
the computation at timem just after the variable ` is set to the value ` = c on line 6. In order to establish the inductive step
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(i.e., show thatMi[m] = Mj[m]), we prove thatM(c)i = M(c)j for all the values c ≤ min{`i, `j}. Observe by line 8 that the loop
is exited exactly if G(`)i = G(`−1)i . By definition, G(`)i and G(`−1)i are completely determined byM(`)i andM(`−1)i , respectively,
and the same is true for the corresponding graphs Gj and cores Mj. Therefore, if `i ≤ `j, and if M(`)i = M(`)j for all values
` ≤ `i, then the condition on line 8 evaluates to true for i at the same iteration that it does for j. It follows that `i = `j for
all i and j: all nonfaulty processes perform the same number of iterations at time m. By line 9 we have that Mi[m] = M(`i)i
and, similarly, thatMj[m] = M(`j)j . Thus, it suffices to show thatM(c)i = M(c)j for all c ≤ `i ≤ `j. We prove this by induction
on c . For every nonfaulty process i, we have that M(1)i = Mi[m − 1] by definition. Since Mi[m − 1] = Mj[m − 1] by the
inductive hypothesis, we obtain thatM(1)i = M(1)j , establishing the base case of c = 1. Suppose thatM(c)i = M(c)j ; we prove
that M(c+1)i = M(c+1)j . Notice that G(c)i is computed according to M(c)i and since, by the inductive hypothesis, we have that
M(c)i = M(c)j , it follows that G(c)i = G(c)j . Thus in the cth iteration processes i and j perform their computations using the
same conflict graph.
In each iteration, i considers each of the messages α ∈ RCVDi(m) for inclusion of F (α) inMi, by testing Auth(G(c), α, t).
In order to prove M(c+1)i = M(c+1)j , we prove, for all propositions ϕ ∈ ΦE , that if ϕ ∈ M(c+1)i , then ϕ ∈ M(c+1)j . So assume
that ϕ ∈ M(c+1)i . If ϕ ∈ M(c)i , then we have by the inductive hypothesis that ϕ ∈ M(c)j , and thus ϕ ∈ M(c+1)j , as desired. If
ϕ is added to Mi in the cth iteration, then ϕ = F (α) for some datagram α ∈ RCVDi(m), and ϕ is inserted into the core on
line 5 of VC-CC. This implies that Auth(G(c)i , α, t) returns TRUE, which can happen based on three possible conditions. We
analyze each of the cases separately:
– The Auth subroutine returns on line 4: Since Auth returns on line 4, we have by line 1 that the datagram α is d-signed
by a set of processes D and d ≥ t − b + 1, where b = vc#(G′) and G′ = G[P\D]. By line 3 we have that vc#(G′) = b.
Hence, there must be at least b faulty processes in D = P\D, and so there can be at most t− b faulty processes in D. Since
|D| ≥ t − b+ 1, at least one of the processes in Dmust be nonfaulty.
By Lemma 4, there exists a set H ⊂ D such that |H| ≤ 2b and vc#(G′[H]) = b. Let H = D\H . Since |H| ≤ 2b,
we have that |H| ≥ |D| − 2b = n − d − 2b. Since n > 3t by assumption, and d ≤ t by line 1 of Auth, it follows that
|H| > 3t−d−2b ≥ 3t− t−2b = 2t−2b = 2(t−b). Our goal now is to show that every nonfaulty j 6= iwill placeF (α)
inMj. Let 〈p1, . . . , pd〉 be the sequence of signatures on α. (Observe that D = {p1, . . . , pd}.) Let γ be the largest index of
a nonfaulty process in the sequence. Since there are at most t − b faulty processes in D, we have that d − γ ≤ t − b.
If γ = d then α ∈ RCVDj(m) and j would test for Auth(G(c)j , α, t) in iteration c . Since G(c)j = G(c)i , this is exactly the
same computation that i performed, which returns TRUE, and so j addsF (α) intoMj, as required. For the remaining case,
suppose that γ < d. Recall that vc#(G[H]) = b, and so H contains at least b faulty processes. H ∩ H = ∅, and so H
contains at most t − b failures. Since |H| > 2(t − b), there are more than t − b correct processes in H . Moreover, since
d−γ < t−b, we have that j receives amessage β consisting of ϕ = F (β) = F (α) signed by 〈p1, . . . , pγ , qγ+1, . . . , qd〉
in roundm. Let D′ = {p1, . . . , pγ , qγ+1, . . . , qd}. Since D′ ∩ H = ∅we have that (P\D′) ⊃ H . By definition of H we have
that vc#(G[H]) = b, and since G[H] is a subgraph of G[P\D′] we have that vc#(G[P\D′]) = b′ ≥ b for some value b′.
Therefore, β is signed by d ≥ t − b + 1 ≥ t − b′ + 1 processes, and so Auth(G(c), β, t) returns TRUE on line 4 as well.
Thus, by line 5 of VC-CC, the proposition ϕ = F (β) is entered intoMj, as desired.
– Auth returns due to the test on line 6: Line 5 of Auth sets X to be the intersection of all the VCs ν of G of size |ν| ≤ t .
Let x , |X | and X = P\X . Since the processes in X are faulty in all possible interpretations of the failures depicted by
the conflict graph G, the set X contains at most t − x faulty processes. Since process i receives α, which is signed by a
sequence of processes, S = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pd〉, at least t − x + 1 of which are from X , we have that at least one of these
processes must be nonfaulty. Assume, without loss of generality, that pγ is nonfaulty, and denote by z the number of
processes from X in the prefix of signatures {p1, . . . , pγ }. Since pγ is nonfaulty, it successfully forwards F (α) signed
by the sequence 〈p1, . . . , pγ 〉 to all nonfaulty processes. Since we assume that processes use a sfip, in round m every
nonfaulty process will receive F (α) signed by a sequence S′ = 〈p1, . . . , pγ , qγ+1, . . . , qd〉 such that all processes in
{qγ+1, . . . , qd} are nonfaulty. Recall that none of the q signatures is that of a process from X . Since qd is nonfaulty, α
signed by 〈p1, . . . , pγ , qγ+1, . . . , qd〉 is received by all nonfaulty processes at time m. The number of processes signing
this message that are not in X must be no smaller than in 〈p1, . . . , pd〉. Hence, the test about F (α) signed by S′ on line 6
of Auth is satisfied for every nonfaulty process, Auth returns TRUE, and every nonfaulty process adds F (α) to the core
at timem.
– Auth returns TRUE due to the test on line 7: Since α is (t + 1)-signed, it must contain at least one signature by a
nonfaulty process. By the proof of Lemma 2, we have that process j receives a (t + 1)-signed datagram containing F (α)
in roundm as well, and thus adds ϕ = F (α) toMj by line 8.
We have shown that in all the cases in which process i adds ϕ to its core in the `th iteration, process j inserts ϕ into
its core as well. Thus, ϕ ∈ M(c+1)j [m]. Since i and j are symmetric in this regard, and by the inductive hypothesis we have
that M(c)i = M(c)j , we obtain that M(c+1)i = M(c+1)j , which completes our proof of the inductive step, and the proof of the
theorem. 
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4. Byzantine continuous consensus
So far we have discussed the generalized omission model. However, since we are using signatures, a natural extension
of our analysis is to consider CC in the authenticated Byzantine model. Our assumption in this model is that although faulty
processes may be ‘‘liars,’’ they can lie only about their own local states, their external inputs, and the messages they have
received. They cannot forge signatures, however, and so cannot alter any relayed information. The specification of the CC
problem must therefore be changed for the Authenticated Byzantine setting. This is done as follows:
We modify the contents of the cores. Instead of containing propositions fromΦE = {pe : e ∈ E}, cores will now contain
items consisting of such a proposition with a single signature. Moreover, the nrec(i, j, k) propositions that determine the
conflicts recorded in the core will appear only with i’s signature. When using authentication, items in the core cannot be
forged, since when a process receives a datagram including a signed proposition, it is able verify the proposition based on
the first signature. We can now interpret an item in the core as stating that the process signing it claims that the proposition
is true. With this interpretation, Accuracy is no longer problematic. Completeness now requires that if a monitored event
occurs at a nonfaulty process i, then eventually the fact that i claims that it occurred is in the core.
With these changes, it is easy to verify that both the protocols shown in Section 2, as well as the ones shown in Section 3,
provide a solution to the CC problem. The use of authentication eliminates the possibility of forging relayedmessages, while
a message produced by a faulty process j stating a proposition q is not considered a lie in our context, since it is indeed true
that ‘‘j claims that q’’. Notice, however, that the core may still contain both ‘‘j claims that q’’ and ‘‘j claims that¬q’’, provided
that j is faulty. Dealing with the consistency of the claims made in the core is an interesting topic that is beyond the scope
of this work.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the continuous consensus problem in the generalized omission and authenticated Byzantine
failure models. We presented two very simple protocols, Acc and AccD, that solve the CC problem in these models. The
former enters events into the core exactly t + 1 rounds after they occur, while the latter can often do so faster. We showed
that these protocols can be implemented quite efficiently.Whereas Acc requires n > 2t , the AccD protocols works correctly
when n > t . In addition, AccD is early stopping, while Acc satisfies the weak uniform consistency property.
Although Acc and AccD both also solve the CC problem in the crash and omission models, neither is optimal. In both
protocols it takes at least t + 1 rounds from the time that an event takes place until it is included in the core. As shown
in [6], in the crash and in the sending omission models, some events may enter the core much sooner than this, by using a
protocol called ConCon.
It was shown that by maintaining a conflict graph of the system, processes obtain information about failures in the run,
which allows them to add facts to the core sooner than t + 1 rounds after their occurrence. We presented a very simple
protocol called AccI that uses the conflict graph to identify a set of confirmed faulty processes, thus enabling processes to
include in the core datagrams with less than t + 1 signatures.
Finally, we presented VC-CC, which, in addition to the techniques used by the protocols previously described, uses a
subtle vertex-cover computation to obtain further information about failures in the system. While this solution produces a
richer core, it is computationally inefficient, since it requires computing the minimal vertex-cover, which is NP-hard. This
is the first case in which simultaneous agreement protocols are given for failure models that are more general than the
omissions model, in which decision can take place (simultaneously) before time t + 1. An interesting open problem is to
extend this approach to the challenging general (unauthenticated) Byzantine failure model [1,4,5,7,8].
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Appendix A. Proofs of Correctness for Acc and AccD
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 28 in [7] presents a class of executions of simultaneous choice problems, for which
an optimum solution in the generalized omissionsmodel requires NP hard (vertex cover) computations. The proof applies, in
particular, to the simultaneous version of thewell-known consensusproblem. The proof shows that depending on the answer
to an arbitrary instance of vertex cover, either particular initial values become common knowledge (and simultaneous
consensus can be reached) in round ` = 3 under the full-information protocol, or no information about the initial values is
common knowledge. We can define E = {vali = x : i ∈ P & x ∈ {0, 1}} in a setting in which external inputs appear only in
the form of initial values of 0 and 1. It then follows by the connection between common knowledge and CC established in
[6] and the analysis in [7] that an optimum CC protocol would have a proposition pe for e ∈ E in the core at time ` = 3 iff
pe is common knowledge at that point. The proof of Lemma 28 in [7] thus shows that computing whether pe is in the core
at time ` = 4 is an NP-hard problem. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. We first prove the Accuracy property. If pe ∈ Mi[k] for a nonfaulty process i, then at some earlier time
m ≤ k, pe = F (α) is inserted into the core at line 4 of Acc. Thus, by line 3 of the protocol, α is a (t + 1)-signed datagram,
and thus, in particular, pe is an authenticated proposition. Since e ∈ ΦBE , then, by the definition of ΦBE , and since pe is
authenticated, e is guaranteed to have occurred, and we have Accuracy.
For Completeness, assume that an event e ∈ EB occurs at a nonfaulty process j at timem, and is thus included in j’s view
at timem. Since j is nonfaulty, it successfully sends a message notifying the other nonfaulty processes about e’s occurrence.
Since n > 2t , at the end of round m + t + 1 at least t + 1 nonfaulty processes will have sequentially signed and relayed
the datagram containing pe, and thus at the end of round m + t + 1 every nonfaulty process will receive a (t + 1)-signed
datagram regarding e. Following lines 3 and 4 of Acc, every nonfaulty process will then add pe to its core.
Finally, for Consistency, we prove that if i and j are nonfaulty, then Mi[m] = Mj[m] for all m ≥ 0. Without loss of
generality, we prove that if ϕ ∈ Mi[m] then ϕ ∈ Mj[m]. The proof is by induction on m. The case of m = 0 is immediate
from the initialization phase, sinceMi[m] = Mj[m] = ∅. LetM > 0, and assume inductively thatMi[m − 1] = Mj[m − 1].
Suppose that ϕ ∈ Mi[m]\Mi[m− 1]. Then, by line 3 of the protocol, i receives a (t + 1)-signed datagram α in roundm, with
F (α) = ϕ. Let Pˆ = 〈p1, . . . , pt+1〉 be the sequence of signatures on α. Since there are at most t faulty processes, at least
one of the processes in Pˆ must be nonfaulty. Let ` = max{i ≤ t + 1 : pi ∈ Pˆ is nonfaulty}. If i = t + 1, then j receives α in
round m and adds ϕ = F (α) to Mj[m], as required. So suppose that i < t + 1. Since n > 2t , there must be at least t + 1
nonfaulty processes, and thus at least t + 1 − ` nonfaulty processes not in {p1, . . . , p`}. Let {q1, q2, . . . , qt+1−`} be a set
of t − ` + 1 nonfaulty processes not in {p1, . . . , p`}. Since the processes relay messages according to sfip, we have for all
1 ≤ h ≤ t+1−` that nonfaulty process qh receives ϕ signed by 〈p1, . . . , p`, q1, q2, . . . , qh−1〉 in roundm−(t−`+h), signs
it and sends it out in the following round. As a result, in round m process j receives the datagram β consisting of ϕ signed
by 〈p1, . . . , p`, q1, q2, . . . , qt+1−`〉. The test on line 3 succeeds, and ϕ is added toMj[m] on line 4, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof that AccD satisfies Accuracy is similar to the proof Acc satisfies Accuracy.
For Completeness, assume that an event e ∈ EB occurs at a nonfaulty process j at timem, and is thus included in j’s view
at timem. Since j is nonfaulty, it successfully sends a message notifying the other nonfaulty processes about e’s occurrence.
Every nonfaulty process i, upon receiving j’s message, will recognize it as a 1-signed datagram about e (line 3 of AccD), and
will thus add it toMi[m+ t + 1]. This gives us Completeness.
To prove Consistency, we show that if i and j are nonfaulty, thenMi[m] = Mj[m] for allm ≥ 0.Without loss of generality,
we prove that if ϕ ∈ Mi[m] then ϕ ∈ Mj[m]. Suppose that ϕ ∈ Mi[m]. Thus, for some time ` ≤ m, ϕ is added toMi[`]. Thus,
by line 4 in the protocol, there must be some d such that 1 ≤ d ≤ t + 1 and k ≤ ` such that ` = k+ (t + 1)− d. Thus, there
exists a set Pˆ = {p1, . . . , pd} of processes and a datagram α = signpd(signpd−1(. . . signp1(ϕ) . . .)) such that α ∈ RCVDi(k).
If d = t + 1, then, since n > t , there must be at least one nonfaulty process ps ∈ Pˆ for some 1 ≤ s ≤ t + 1. Since ps is
nonfaulty, in round `− (t + 1− s) it successfully sends the datagram signps(. . . (signp1(ϕ) . . .)) to j, and thus, at the end of
round `−(t+1− s), process j performs line 4 of the protocol, and adds ϕ toMj[`]. Now suppose that d < t+1. If j ∈ Pˆ , then
in round `− (t + 1− s) process j reaches line 4 in the protocol and adds ϕ toMj[`]. On the other hand, if j 6∈ Pˆ , then since i
is nonfaulty, the datagram signi(α) is delivered to j successfully in round k+ 1. Process j then reaches line 4 in the protocol
in round k+1, and addsF (signi(α)) toMj[`], and again we have ϕ ∈ Mj[`]. As we have seen, in either case ϕ ∈ Mj[`]. From
line 6 in the protocol, ϕ ∈ Mj[`′] for all `′ ≥ `, and thus, in particular, ϕ ∈ Mj[m], and we are done. 
Appendix B. The minimal vertex cover property
We now review some graph-theoretic background and use it to prove Lemma 4. Our proof will be based on a
strengthening of the Nemhauser–Trotter Theorem due to Chlebík and Chlebíková [2]. Let G = (V , E) and U ⊆ V . We
denote by ∂U the set of v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E for some u ∈ U . The following is a rephrasing of sections (ii), (iii) and (v)
in Theorem 2 of [2]3:
Proposition 1 (Chlebík and Chlebíková). Let G = (V , E) be an undirected graph. There is a partition of V into three sets A, B
and C such that the following properties hold.
(a) There are no edges between A and C or among the nodes of C.
(b) Let ν be a minimal cover of G and denote ν ∩ B by νB. Then (i) ν = νB ∪ A, (ii) |νB| ≥ |B|2 , and (iii) νB is a minimal vertex cover
of G[B].
(c) |∂U∩ C | ≥ |U| for every subset U ⊆ A.
In a graph G = (V , E), with A and C disjoint subsets of V , we call a matching in G a matching of A into C if it pairs every
node of Awith a node of C . Part (c) of Proposition 1will be used in conjunction with the following version of Hall’s Theorem:
Proposition 2 (Hall 1935). Let G = (V , E) and let A and C be disjoint subsets of V . If |∂U∩ C | ≥ |U| for every subset U ⊆ A,
then there is a matching MA ⊂ E of A into C.
3 The results in [2] are stated for the more general case of minimal vertex covers in vertex-weighted graphs (G, w). Classical minimal vertex covers, as
needed in our case, correspond to the particular instance in which all nodes v ∈ V are assigned the weightw(v) = 1.
T. Mizrahi, Y. Moses / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 3031–3041 3041
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4:
Proof of Lemma 4. Let G = (V , E) be an undirected graph with vc#(G) = b. Let A, B, and C be a partition of V with the
properties guaranteed in Proposition 1. By Proposition 1(c) we have that |∂U∩ C | ≥ |U| holds for every subset U ⊆ A. Thus,
by Proposition 2 (Hall’s Theorem), G contains a matching MA ⊂ E of A into C . Denote the nodes of C matched in MA by CA.
Define H = A ∪ B ∪ CA. We need to show two things:
|H| ≤ 2b: Choose an arbitrary minimal vertex cover ν of G, and let νB = ν ∩ B. By Proposition 1(b)(i) we have that
ν = νB ∪ A, and since A is disjoint from νB, we have that |A| + |νB| = b. Proposition 1(b)(ii) states that 2|νB| ≥ |B|.
Moreover, since A is perfectly matched to CA, we have that |A| = |CA|. Finally, the fact that A, B, and CA are disjoint implies
that |H| = |A| + |B| + |CA| = 2|A| + |B| ≤ 2|A| + 2|νB| = 2(|A| + |νB|) = 2b. Thus, H ≤ 2b, as desired.
vc#(G[H]) = b: By Proposition 1(b)(iii) we have that νB is a minimal vertex cover of G[B]. Denote by GM the subgraph
(A ∪ CA,MA) of G induced by the matching MA. Observe that vc#(GM) = |A| since MA is a perfect matching of A and CA.
Denote by G′ the graph obtained by taking the union of G[B] and GM . Since G[B] is both edge and vertex-disjoint from GM , it
follows that the vc number of G′ is |νB| + |A| = b. Observe that G′ is a subgraph of G[H], while G[H] is a subgraph of G. Thus,
vc#(G′) ≤ vc#(G[H]) ≤ vc#(G). Since vc#(G′) = vc#(G) = b, it follows that vc#(G[H]) = b, and we are done. 
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